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Perfidy in Non-International Armed
Conflicts

Richard B. Jackson'
Introduction

P

erfidy isa grave breach, or serions crim e, under the law of war. It is generally
defined as "acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe
that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of intern ational law applicable in armed conflict, with inten t to betray that confidence."l Ex-

amples include using the white flag to lure an enemy into the open, or feigning
incapacitation by wounds or sickness; the most egregious violations include using

protected status, as a civilian or a medical professional, to treacherously kill or
wound an enemy.
In the current and recent conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Pakistan,
all of which are non -international armed conflicts of varying degrees of intensity,
actions that would be described as perfidy if they had occurred in an international
armed confli ct are rampant. On January 19, 2011 , for example, Iraqi insurgents
used an ambulance bomb to attack an Iraqi police station in Diyala province, killing five and wounding seventy-six individuals, the majority of whom were civilians.2 On the afternoon of July 5,20 11, a suicide bomber, disguised as a civilian,
detonated a truckload of explosives near a municipal building in Taji, Iraq; as
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friends and neighbors, including young children, rushed to help the injured, a second
suicide bomber attacked from among the crowd.3 In Afghanistan, on Apri17, 2011, a
suicide bomber used an ambulance to infiltrate a police checkpoint and then detonated his bomb, killing Six.4 In Somalia, AI-Shabaab, an AI Qaeda-affiliated group
fighting the fledgling Somali government, has trained women to be suicide bombers, so they can launch their attacks while appearing to be innocent civilian females,
dressed in traditional Moslem garb. S And Pakistani insurgents have employed similar asymmetric tactics. On May 13, 2011, just days after the death of Bin Laden, the
Pakistani Taliban returned to the practice oflaunching suicide attacks from among
the civilian populace.6
The question to be addressed is whether the war crime of perfidy exists in the
law of war pertaining to non-international armed conflicts. Or phrased in another
manner, is it appropriate to apply this term outside of international armed conflict,
where the rules are defined by treaty and customary international law? The Manual
on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict suggests that at least some of the
conduct defined as perfidy when occurring during an international armed conflict
is also perfidious when occurring during non -international anned conflicts.? What
are its parameters and how many of the concepts from international armed conflict
are to be incorporated into the law of non -international armed conflicts?
An answer to these questions requires an examination of the Additional Protocol I (AP I) definition of perfidy in international armed conflict and its antecedents, an analysis of the existing treaty law of non-international armed conflict
(Additional Protocol II (AP 11))8 and an extrapolation of the principles established
in AP I for international armed conflicts into the law for non-international armed
conflicts. Although many of the specific provisions of AP I were not included in
AP II, Additional Protocol II includes the same general protections as AP I, which
suggests that the more specific provisions of AP I that give form and substance to
the general protections can be used to enforce compliance with those general
protections in non-international armed conflict, as a matter of customary internationallaw. As Bothe, Partsch and Solf suggest in their seminal work on the protocols, "The concept of general protection ... is broad enough to cover protections
which flow as necessary inferences from other provisions of Protocol 11."9 The
basic principle of distinction and the protective principle of the law of armed conflict (also referred to as international humanitarian law) logically lead to the incorporation of the prohibition on perfidy, by inference, into the law applicable to
non-international anned conflict. In addition, the near-universal condemnation
of perfidious attacks and current State practice in those confli cts, the practice of
some international criminal tribunals, the practices adopted by States fighting
these conflicts and recent U.S. military commission cases provide substantial
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support for application of a rule against perfidy in non-international armed conflicts in order to provide a sanction for the perfidious use of internationally recognized emblems and protected statuses.
Protection of the civilian populace is essential in these complex conflicts. As the
U.S. Army and Marine Corps' Counterinsurgency Manual indicates, the protection
of civilians is the paramount requirement of the State in a non-international armed
conflict "The cornerstone of any COIN [counterinsurgency] effort is establishing
security for the civilian populace,"lo The prosecution of perfidy, as a serious crime or
grave breach under the law of war, is required to protect the civilian population and
respect humanitarian efforts in this prevalent form of conflict , whether labeled
" transnational" or "intra-State non-international armed conflict."
The law that applies to the conduct of armed forces in a non-international
armed conflict is derived from treaty law and customary international law. However, the customary international law status of perfidy in non-international conflict is difficult to establish under the current U.S. view of customary international
law. II There is little or no evidence of perfidy violations being prosecuted under internationallaw in non-international armed conflicts, nor is there dear opinio juris
by States on this matter. Emerging customary international law must be inferred,
therefore, from the pr inciples of the law of a rmed conflict supported by evidence
provided by jurists, official statements, statutes, the works of eminent writers and
evidence of State practice. 12

Treaty Provisions
General Principles
Treaty provisions adopting perfidy as a crime in non-international armed conflict
are nearly non-existent. 13 The law of anned conflict provisions from which a rule
against perfidy may be derived, however, are dearly enunciated in Additional Protocol II. The United States has signed AP II and three presidents have recommended it be ratified by the Senate under the U.S. advice and consent
constitutional process. 14 At a minimum, U.S. forces are bound not to act contrary
to the purpose and intent of the treaty. IS President Reagan, in transmitting the
treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, noted the importance of the humanitarian provisions of AP II, focusing on the provisions designed to protect those
who are hors de combat from intentional killing:
The United States has traditionally been in the forefront of efforts to codify and improve the international rules of humanitarian law in armed conflict, with the objective
of giving the greatest possible protection to victims of such conflicts, consistent with
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legitimate military requirements. The agreement I am transmitting today is, with certain exceptions, 16 a positive step toward this goal. Its ratification by the United States
will assist us in contin uing to exercise leadership in the in ternational community
in these matters. . .. Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions is essentially an expansion of the fundamental humanitarian provisions contained in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions with respect to non-international armed conflicts, including humane
treatment and basic due process for detained persons, protection of the wounded, sick,
and medical units, and protection of noncombatants from attack and deliberate starvation. If these fundame ntal rules were observed, many of the worst human tragedies
of current internal armed conflicts could be avoided .... This Protocol makes dear that
any deliberate killing of a noncombatant in the course of a non-international armed
conflict is a violation of the laws of war and a crime against humanity, and is therefore
punishable as murder. l?
In ad dition, various U.S. officials have signaled the intent o f the United States
government to comply with provisions of the treaty, including the protection ofcivilian s and th e prevent ion o f intentional killing or serious bodily harm of those
that are p ro tected under the hum anitarian provisions of the law of waLlS In his discussion of Presiden t Reagan 's intent to ratify AP II, JudgeAbraham Sofaer, the Departm en t of State Legal Advisor in 1987, expressed the desire of the U.S.
government to "guarantee that certain fundamen tal p ro tections be observed," including " protectio n from inten tional attack, hostage takin g, an d acts of terrorism
[against] persons who take no active part in hostilities," "protection and appropriate
care for the sick and wounded, and medical units which assist them " and "protection
of the civilian population from military attack [and ] acts o f terror ."19
Additional Protocol II contains several provisions th at articulate gen eral principles of th e law of arm ed con flict that are relevant to the crime of perfidy. Article 4
provides for human e treatmen t for those no longer taking a direct part in hostilities; Article 7 protects the woun ded an d sick; and Articles 9 through 12 provide
protection to medical person nel, units, transports, an d functions, via the internationally recognized red cross, red crescent an d red lio n emblems.20 Article 12 conclud es that the emb lems "shall not be used improperly." Article 13 provid es that
civilian s "shall not be the object of attack . . . unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities." Article 16 provides protection to cultural objects an d
places of worsh ip. Relief societies, m arked with the aforem en tioned emblems, are
also allowed to "offer their services" to perform their traditional functions in relation to th e victims of armed conflict un der Article 18, so long as they provide services of an "exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature." All of these provisions
provide for the general protections that are enforced through the prohibitio n of the
grave breach of perfidy.
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Origins of the Prohibition of Perfidy
The origins of the prohibition of perfidy are found in the early law of war treatises and treaties of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In his 1810
Treatise on the Law of War, Van Bynkershoek wrote that he believed that fraud
and deceit were lawful and essential stratagems of war: "For my part, I think that
every species of deceit is lawful, perfidy only excepted . . .. "21 He decried as an example of perfidious conduct the offer of a Dutch sea captain of passage to the governor of the Canary Islands, whom, when the governor accepted, the captain made
a prisoner for ransom . Van Bynkershoek likened this to an act of perfidy: "precisely the same as going to an enemy under the protected flag of truce, with an intention to seize upon the first favourable opportunity to take away his life ."22
Francis Lieber, who gathered in his Lieber Code m uch of the law of nations from
the same Napoleonic period, noted:
Art. 16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty- that is, the infliction of suffering
for the sake of suffering or revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight. . . . It
admits of deceptio n, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity
does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily
difficult.
Art. 65. The use of the enemy's national standard, flag, or other emblem of nationality,
for the purpose of deceivi ng the enemy in battle, is an act of perfidy by which they lose
all claim to the protection of the laws of war.
Art. 10 1. While deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary means of hostility,
and is consistent with honorable warfare, the common law of wa r allows even capital
punishment fo r clandestine o r treacherous attempts to injure an enemy, because they
are so dangerous, and it is so difficult to guard against them.
Art. 11 7. It is justly considered an act of bad faith, of infamy o r fiendishness, to deceive
the enemy by flags of protection [incl uding flags of truce and hospital designatio n).23

Finally, Lieber provided that these "rules of war" are appropriate for a civil war,
without reference to the legitimacy of the "rebels," as "humanity induces the
adoption of rules of regular war toward the rebels, whether the adoption is partial or
entire, [while] it does in no way whatever imply a partial or complete acknowledgement of their government. "24 In its earliest form of codification, the law of war
provided for the grave breach of perfidy, even in non-international armed conflict.
The 1907 Hague Regulations codified, in a broadly adopted treaty, the concept
of perfidy.25 Article 23 (b) provided that it was "especially forbidden" to "kill or

24 1

Perfidy in Non-International Anned Conflicts
wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army" and Article 23(1) prohibited "improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the
military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the
Geneva Convention."26 Although the Hague Regulations applied between States
parties, the famo us "Martens clausc" in Article 2 arguably extends many of these
rules to other forms of warfare in stating that "the inhabitants and the belligerents
remain under the protections of and the rule of the principles of the law of nations,
as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."
In Spaight's 1911 seminal War Rights on Land, he noted the application of the
rule against perfidy to a broad range of conduct. Quoting Hall, Oppenheim and
Bluntschli, Spaight found that use of an enemy uniform, insignia or flag is permitted "up to the commencement of actual fighting. "27 Spaight also provided numerous examples of strict and less strict interpretations of this provision from the U.S.
Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, the Crimean War and the Boer War. 28 As a
clear case of "treacherous attempts to kill or wound," he cited the use of civilian
clothes by belligerent troops of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War. 29 And, as
an example of the perfidious use of a protected emblem, Spaight cited both the
"treacherous overt act-if, for instance, by making a sudden attempt [under a
white flag], he kills the enemy commander"30-and the "treacherous simulation of
sickness or wounds" in the Russo-Japanese War.3l These examples, applied in international (Franco-Prussian and Crimean Wars) and non-international (Boer
and U.S. Civil Wars) armed conflicts, validate the strength, breadth and application of the prohibition on perfidious conduct across the spectrum of conflict.
Application of the Rules against Perfidy
Skorzeny Case
As evidenced by documents and treatises antecedent to the Second World War,
perfidy was a crime that included treacherous use of the enemy unifonn . A significant case that arose during the prosecutions before the International Military Tribunals illuminated the difference between the ruse of inftltration using the enemy
uniform, and the "improper use" of the enemy unifonn to kill or wound in violation of Article 23(1) of the Hague Regulations. Colonel Otto Skorzeny, the celebrated German commando who had rescued Mussolini from Italian partisans, was
prosecuted, along with nine of his soldiers, for the "improper use of American uniforms by entering into combat disguised therewith and treacherously firing upon
and killing members of the armed forces of the US."12 The trial produced testimony that Skorzeny's commandos, who were charged with seizing bridges and
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road intersections in advance of the Battle of the Bulge, were instructed to use
American uniforms to infiltrate the lines, but to avoid fighting in enemy uniforms.
At trial, no evidence of U.S. soldiers being killed or wounded by Germans fighting
in American uniforms was produced, so all the accused were acquitted. 3) Since the
published report contains only the findings of the court, without explanation, the
" Notes on the Case," prepared by the War Crimes Commission, provide the only
rationale for the decision. They explain the decision by noting the lack of treacherous killing or wounding, as well as citing the U.S. Rules of Land Warfare of October
1940, which permitted the use of enemy uniforms and insignia as a ruse, but prohibited their use during combat, requiring that they be discarded before opening
fire upon the enemy.34 While the prohibition on use of enemy uniforms in combat
has survived, even into non-international anned conflict,35 the modern grave
breach of perfidy has not included the misuse of enemy uniforms.36
Perfidy during the Cold War: Special Operation s Forces
In a 2003 article, W. Hays Parks described nwnerous examples of the use of civilian
clothing in special operations missions that ranged from clandestine direct action
missions to special reconnaissance missions deep within enemy-held territoryY
Several reported cases of soldiers wearing civilian clothes while on a mission to attack civilian objects arose from the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia in the
196Os. A Malaysian case, Krofan and Another, arising from the international armed
conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia over the status of Singapore (then a part
of Malaysia) and other nearby territories, illustrates the use of civilian clothes as a
violation of the law of war.38 While the case turns on the issue of the lack of status of
the Indonesian soldiers as prisoners of war due to their mission of sabotage, the
Singapore court decried the tactic of wearing civilian clothes because of its tendency to endanger civilians: "Both [spies and saboteurs I seek to harm the enemy by
clandestine means by carrying out their hostile operations in circumstances which
render it difficult to distinguish them from civilians. ")9
Parks also cites several examples of Soviet Spetsnaz (Special Operations) Forces
and Israeli commandos using civilian clothes to inftltrate and capture or kill enemy
forces.40 None of these cases resulted in charges of perfidy, however, as they rested
on claims of "unlawful belligerency" and the crimes of espionage or sabotage under domestic statutes, rather than law of war violations. Parks cautioned military
forces to avoid perfidy, which he said was synonymous with "treacherous wounding" under the Hague Regulations,~l and noted that the principle of distinction is
"at the heart of the balance" between lawful military operations and perfidy. Finally, he concluded that the drafters of the 1977 Protocols decided to criminalize
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use of civilian clothing " in the most egregious circumstances, such as terrorism and
treacherous use of civilian clothing."42

A Modern Definition of Perfidy: Additional Protocol I
While it may be difficult to trace the precise application of the " treacherous killing
or wounding" provisions of Article 23 from the Hague Regulations to the present,
Additional Protocol I, which unified the Hague and Geneva traditions of the law of
war, specifically addresses the definition of perfidy in international armed conflict:
It is prohibited to kill, injure, or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting
the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe he is entitled to, or is obliged toaccord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with
intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The foUowingare examples of
perfidy:

(a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender;
(b) the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;
(c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and

(d) the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the
United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflictP

Article 37 goes on to distinguish "ruses of war," or acts " intended to mislead an
adversary ... which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of
an adversary with respect to protection under the law." A distinction between these
concepts is essential to understanding perfidy. As Oppenheim notes, "whenever a
belligerent has expressly or tacitly engaged, and is therefore bound by a moral obligation to speak truth to an enemy, it is perfidy to betray his confidence, because it
constitutes a breach of good faith."44
While the prohibitions on perfidy contained in AP I are broad, the grave
breaches that are prohibited are narrowly defined. First, grave breaches are limited
to those violations of the law of war that are "committed willfully" (incorporating a
mens rea element) and cause "death or serio us injury to body or health."45 And the
specific provisions of perfid y that constitute grave breaches only include misuse of
internationally protected emblems, outlined in Articles 37 and 38, that result in
death or serious bodily harm. 46 So, while perfidy may be more broadly construed to
include a number of "breaches of faith" on the international armed conflict battlefield, the violations of the law of war that are designated as "grave breaches," with
the requirement to "prosecute o r extradite" perpetrators,47 are few.
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So what elements of perfidy, as described in Protocol I, can be extrapolated to noninternational armed conflict? The Manual on tile Law of Non-International Armed
Conflict (NIAC Manual) describes perfidy in non-international armed conflict
rather broadly. It prohibits " [d ]isplaying the white flag falsely, or pretending to
surrender, be wounded, or otherwise have a protected status . . . if the intent in doing so is to kill or wound an adversary."48 How much ofthis definition fits the standard established by Bothe, Partsch and Solf. "The concept of general protection .. .
is broad enough to cover protections which flow as necessary inferences from other
provisions ofProtocol lI"?49 In other words, do the general principles adopted in
AP II support a customary international law application of the specific provisions
that prohibit that same conduct in international armed conflict? Are the provisions
of this proposed rule consistent with the protective principle and the principle of
distinction? And how many of these rules have been adopted in practice?
The Principles of Additional Protocol II and Their Connection to Perfidy
The principle of distinction is clearly en unciated in Protocol II, the t reaty governing non-international armed conflicts that cross certain thresholds, and customary
international law. Article 13 provides that civilians are to be protected "against the
dangers arising from military operations ... unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities."so The principle of distinction (also characterized as "discrimination") is also enshrined in treaty law applicable to non-international armed
conflict in protocols of the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention.51 For example, Article 3(8) of the Amended Mines Protocol II, which by its provisions applies to Common Article 3 conflicts, requires distinction between military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects.52 Finally, distinction is clearly recognized in customary international law as applying in non-international armed
conflicts. 53 For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (lCfY) noted in the Kupreskic case, "The protection of civilians in armed
conflict, whether international or internal [non-international], is the bedrock of
modern humanitarian law."S4
Article 13 of AP II sets forth a general "protective principle"ss to protect the
civilian population and individual civilians from the dangers of military operations. As the International Committee of the Red Cross's Commentary notes, the
protection extended to civilians in Article 13 reflects the more detailed protections
of Article 5 1 of Additional Protocol I56-in particular the principle of distinction in
Article 51(4), which defines "indiscriminate attacks" as those attacks which "are of
a nature to strike military objectives (including combatants) and civilians or
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civilian objects without distinction."57 The Commentary goes on to explain that
States are required to fonnulate rules that give fonn and substance to the principle
of distinction:
This radical simplification does not reduce the degree of protection which was initially
envisaged, for despite its brevity, Article 13 reflects the most fundamental rules. How
to implement them is the responsibility of the parties, and this means that the safety
measures they are obliged to take under the rule on protection will have to be developed so as to best suit each situation, the infrastructure available and the means at
their disposal.58

Other provisions of Additional Protocol II emphasize the principles that are reinforced by the prohibition on perfidy, thereby strengthening the argument that
forbidding perfidy is an essential tool for States as "measures they are obliged to
take" to emphasize these protective principles. The "fundamental guarantees" of
Article 4 prohibit murder and other violence to life and health, as well as the giving
of "order[sl that there shall be no sUlVivors,"59 a ban reflecting the "no quarter"
provision of the Hague Regulations. 60 These prohibitions reinforce the requirement to protect the lives of those that are hors de combat, which is so fundamental
to the basic guarantees in Common Article 3.61 Additional Protocol II emphasizes
the importance of extending that protection principle to abolish the feigning of
"protected person status" to gain an advantage on an enemy; failure to respect
those prohibitions on perfidy will encourage enemy soldiers to ignore the protective
principle and murder soldiers and civilians, alike, who are hors de combat, or no
longer taking an active or direct part in hostilities.
Additional Protocol II also extends the protections outlined in AP I to distinctive emblems and medical personnel and units, key targets for protection that are
shielded by enforcement of perfidy provisions. Article 12 of AP II dearly protects
distinctive emblems, which should be "respected in all circumstances" and never
"used improperly." Both of these provisions require the rule against perfidy as an
enforcement mechanism to be adopted by States. Finally, medical personnel are to
be "respected and protected" under Article 9, and medical units and transports
should be "respected and protected at all times and shall not be the object of attack," under Article 11 of AP II. Without the rules against perfidy to guarantee
their status and punish offenders, States lack the enforcement mechanism necessary to guarantee these key protective principles.
Capture as Perfidy?
Perfidy in the form of misuse of a protected emblem to capture an enemy in noninternational armed conflict has not become customary international law. As the
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commentary in the NIAC Manual points out, "The reference to capture does not
appear in the original 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations, Article 23(b), prohibition
and is not binding on non-contracting Parties to Additional Protocol 1."62In addition, as noted above, the grave breach provision of Article 85 of AP I applies only to
acts causing "death or serious injury." The International Committee of the Red
Cross's Customary International Law Sflldy notes that "killing or wounding an
adversary by resort to perfidy" is a serious crime, even in non-international armed
conflict.63 In the Dllsko Tadii case, the ICTY noted that serious crimes, even in
non-international armed conflict, not only must "constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values," which the rule against perfidy certainly protects, but
also "must involve grave consequences for the vidim."M Finally, Article 8.2(e)(ix)
of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) only applies perfidy
to non-internati onal armed conflict in the case of killing and wounding of
an adversary.65
State practice supports the view that misuse of protected emblems that is not the
proximate cause of death or serious injury is proscribed, even in non-international
armed conflict, but it is not considered to be as serious as the crime of perfidy. An
example can be found in the dramatic rescue operation conducted by Colombian
military forces to free Colombian and U.S. hostages from the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).66 The Colombia military infiltrated the radio
net used by the guerrillas and fooled the FARC into believing that the Venezuelan
government had provided "hwnanitarian airlift" to remove the hostages and several guerrillas who were guarding them to a more secure location. Despite the oversight of senior officials in the Colombian government, who instructed the
members of the rescue team to avoid the misuse of protected emblems (and had
them removed from the aircraft), one of the team members wore a shirt with the
red cross emblem dearly visible. Though the Colombian military explained that
the misuse of the emblem was unintended, it was roundly criticized in the press for
this mistake. While the misuse of the emblem, if intentional, may have violated the
prohibition on misuse in Article 12, AP II, the elements of the grave breach of perfidy require more than capture; they require "kill[ing] or wound[ing] treacherously," in the words ofthe Hague Rules. In the end, cries of "perfidy" were muted,
presumably because there is no consensus in the international community about
the validity of characterizing the conduct as perfidious when the misuse of the emblem is used to capture, rather than kill.67
Law Enforcement Tactics
States involved in non-international armed conflicts, particularly those characterized as "counterinsurgencies" by the government forces, often adopt law
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enforcement tactics, which can blur the distinction between government forces
and the civilian populace. Members of civilian law enforcement agencies routinely wear civilian clothing and agents in some law enforcement agencies never
wear uniforms.68 A close working relationship between the military and civilian
law enforcement can be a critical component in counterinsurgency opemtions.69
This may include clandestine operations conducted in civilian clothing by law enforcem ent and m ilitary a uthorities, particularly with respect to sUlVeillance and
other intelligence collection operations. An infonnant or ordinary civilian may be
reluctant to be seen speaking with uniformed law enforcement o r military personnel, for example. There is no prohibition on "spying" by governm ent forces in
non-international armed confli ct, as espionage is generally recognized as a domestic law violation, not a violation of international law,7o and representatives of the
host nation o r supporting foreign forces cannot commit "espionage" against organized armed groups in an internal armed conflict. As Parks notes in his 2003 article, "A 'double standard' exists within the law of war for regular forces of a
recognized government vis-a.-vis unauthorized combatant acts by private individuals or non-State actors." In non-international armed conflict, therefore, government forces (including both law enforcement agents and military personnel acting
under the color of the law of the host nation) can often be expected to don civilian
clothes when gathering infonnation o r providing support to civilian authorities.
While this would not constitute perfidy, there is a fine line between representing
the government in the performance of quasi-law enfo rcement functions and
"feign ing civilian status," thereby putting civilians at risk, in an attem pt to gain an
advantage in attacking insurgent forces .
Feigning Civilian Status
The critical focus of perfidy, in the area offeigning civilian status, is on the principle of "distinction," which protects civilians fro m combatants (including those
classified as "unlawful combatants" and " unprivileged belligerents") on the international and non-international battlefield. Feigning civilian status to gain ad vantage over an enem y in an attack is an act of perfidy that goes to the very heart of the
protective principle and, as such, its designation as a crime in non-international
armed conflicts. In Tadii, the very first ICfY case, the T ribunal recognized the importance of perfidy as a crime under customary international law:
State practice shows that general principles of customary international law have
evolved with regard to internal armed confl.ict also in areas relating to methods of
warfare. In addition to what has been stated above, with regard to the ban on attacks on
civilians in the theatre of hostilities, mention can be made of the prohibition of perfidy.
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Thus, for instance, in a case brought before Nigerian courts, the Supreme Court ofNigeria held that rebels must not feign civilian status while engaging in military operations (citation omitted)?1
It is important to note that Additional Protocoll's deviation from this principle
in Articles 1(4) and 44(3), which collectively expand the notion of international
armed conflict to the traditional non-international armed conflicts of "national
liberation" and allow members of organized armed groups to claim "combatant"
status merely by carrying their arms openly, was critical to the U.S. rejection of the
Protocol. In expressing the Reagan administration's concern regarding Protocol I,
Judge Sofaer, the then Department of State Legal Adviser, decried the failure of Articles 1(4) and 44(3) to protect civilians, stating that these provisions, when taken
together, allow terrorists in wars of "national liberation" to avoid being charged
with perfidy when hiding among the civilian population until the moment of attack, even though thereby putting the civilian populace and the principle of distinction at risk. 12 lbis deviation from the general prohibition of feigning civilian
status to gain a military advantage only applies to international armed conflicts of
"national liberation"; organized armed groups in non-international armed conflict are not permitted to launch attacks from the civilian populace.

/awad and al-Nashiri Cases
Two U.S. military commission cases illustrate the current U.S. practice with
respect to perfidy and the offense of launching an attack while feigning civilian status.
Mohammed Jawad was a young Afghan who was alleged to have thrown a hand
grenade into a vehicle in which two American selVice members and their Afghan
interpreter were riding. He was charged with three specifications of attempted
murder in violation of the law of war and three specifications of intentionally inflicting serious bodily injury. The government alleged that Jawad was concealing
the grenade while dressed in civilian clothes and that he launched his attack from a
crowd of civilians in the streets of Kabul. In support of the charges, the government argued that by his conduct, "the accused unlawfully engaged in combat by
fighting outside of responsible command, by fighting without wearing a distinctive emblem, by failing to carry his arms openly, and by flaunting the laws and customs of war by feigning to be a non -combatant. "n
The second case involves Abd al-Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al-Nashiri, alleged to be the bomber of USS Cole and the attempted bomber of USS The Sullivans, who has been charged with perfidy and attempted murder as follows:
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Charge I: Violation of 10 u.s.c. § 950t( 17), Using Treachery o r Perfidy
Specification: In that Abd al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al NASHIRI ... , an alien
unp rivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial by military comm ission, did, in o r
around Aden, Yemen, on or about 12 October 2000, in the context of and associated
with hostilities. invite the confidence and belief of o ne or more persons onboard USS
COLE (DOG 67), including but not limited to then FN Raymo nd Mooney, USN, that
two men dressed in civilian clothing, waving at the crewmembers onboard USS COLE
(DOG 67), and operating a civilian boat, were entitled to protection under the law of
war, and intending to betray that confidence and belief, did thereafter make use ofthat
confidence and belief to detonate explosives hidden on said civilian boat alongside USS
COLE (DOG 67), killing 17 Sailors of the United States Navy . .. and injuring one o r
more persons, all crewmembers o nboard USS COLE (DDG 67) ... .
Charge III: Violation of 10 U.S.c. § 95Ot(28), Attempted Murder in Violation of the
Law of War
Specification I: In that Abd al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al NASHIRI . . . did, . ..
with the specific intent to commit Mu rder in Violation of the Law of War, attempt to
intentio nally and unlawfully kill one o r mo re persons onboard USS THE SULLIVANS
(DOG 68), in violation of the lawofwar, to wit: by committing an act of perfidy . .. and
to effect the commission of Murder in Violation of the Law of War, the two suicide
bombers dressed in civilian clothes. . . J~

Both these cases illustrate the view of the United States that the wearing of civilian clothes to perfidiously gain an advantage over an opponent when launching an
attack is a crime when it occurs during an international armed conflict. As of the
date of this writing, only in the Jawad case has there been a ruling regarding the offense of perfidy. In that case, Judge Henley ruled that the government could attempt to prove at trial that the attempted murder of the U.S. service members was
perfidious conduct that violated the law ofwar.'s

Government Forces in Non-International Anned Conflict
Foreign forces supporting the sovereign government and government forces in a
non- international armed conflict have a hybrid mission, partly based on armed
conflict and partly based on law enforcement concerns. The law of armed conflict
is invoked because the normal domestic (law enforceme nt) authorities are overwhelmed by organized armed groups, who threaten the very existence of the State.
In recommending some criteria for application of Common Article 3, Pictet noted
that a key element in distinguishing "a genuine armed conflict from a mere act of
banditry or an unorganized or short-lived insurrection" was whether the legal government "is obliged to have recourse to regular military forces against insurgents
organized as military and in possession of a part of the national territory."76 But the
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national security risks entailed in a non-international armed conflict do not require abandonment of societal norms intended to provide minimal protections to
the populace. As Pictet notes in commenting on the minimum standards of Common Article 3:
It mereJy demands respect for certain rules, which were already recognized as essential
in all civilized countries, and enacted in the municipal law of the States in question,
long before the Convention was signed. What Government would dare to claim before
the world, in a case of civil disturbances which could justly be described as mere acts of
banditry, that, Article 3 not being applicable, it was entitled to leave the wounded
uncared for, to inflict torture and mutilations and to take hostages? However useful,
therefore, the various conditions [of Common Article 3J may be. they are not
indispensable, since no Government can object to respecting, in its dealings with internal enemies, whatever the nature of the conflict between it and them, a few essential
rules which it in fact respects daily, under its own laws, even when dealing with common criminals.77

As the U.S. Army and Marine Corps' Counterinsurgency Manual indicates,
COIN forces are constantly moving through the spectrum of conflict, at one moment involved in a pitched battle with organized armed groups and in the next (or
in the next village) supporting host nation law enforcement personnel in conducting civil security operations. under the rubric of "stability operations. "78 But the
raison d'arc of COIN is the same for both aspects of the counterinsurgency fight,
which is "efforts to secure the safety and support of the local populace. "79 Whether
it is law enforcement efforts to "protect and serve" (as many local police forces
demonstrate by the motto displayed on their police cars) or military forces intent on securing the "safety and support of the local populace"so by applying the
law of armed conflict through the protective principle discussed above, both have
the same objective. For example, most military forces operating in a COIN environment apply self-defense rules of engagement. which in application differ little
from law enforcement rules for the use of force. g ] Law enforcement agencies
within the United States invariably conduct their "takedowns" of criminals in uniforms emblazoned with the logos of their agencies (the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Drug Enforcement Administration, for example). While such tactics
protect the agents by preventing confusing law enforcement agents with criminal
gangs and by asserting the lawful pOWer of the government to conduct arrest,
search or seizure, they also protect innocent civilian bystanders by isolating the activity from the civilian populace. The tactical distinctions between COIN operations in non-international armed conflicts conducted for law enforcement
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purposes and those operations conducted with a military purpose fade away when
the commander's intent to avoid civilian casualties is factored into the equationP

u.s. Experience in Afghanistan
Twice in the last year, U.S. forces in Afghanistan have applied the protective
principle and this approach to perfidy to actions by U.S. forces in the current
non -international armed conflict in Afghanistan. The first instance involved the
wearing of civilian clothes by members o f the U.S. armed forces working in support of Afghan civil authorities, such as in the "Afghan Hands" program, where
military members work outside of NATO facilities within the Afghan community
performing duties that are not directly combat related. A U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
(USFOR-A) position paper analyzed the impact of military personnel wearing
civilian clothes and concluded, "The LOW [law of war] does not require U.S. military personnel to wear uniforms if they are not performing a combat-related operation or attempting to deceive the enemy for a milital)' advantage (i.e.,
perfidy)."83 The rationale for this approach, at least in part, was to "clearly and
identifiably distinguish [] combatants from the civilian population," to avoid civilian exposure to combat operations and the "corresponding risk of harm."&4
The paper noted, "Winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population is a
must in a counterinsurgency (COIN) fight and thus protection of the civilian
population must be a priority."8S The paper quoted from a 2003 paper by Major
William Ferrell III: "[O]nce combatants begin distinguishing themselves as civilians, or failing to distinguish themselves from civilians to gain an advantage over
the enemy, civilians will become suspect and ultimately targets."86 The USFOR-A
paper concludes that the wearing of civilian dothes in offensive operations is a
potentia1law of war violation (perfidy) and counsels against such practice, as
"this violates the basic principle of distinction."87 In a related issue, the USFOR-A
Staff Judge Advocate issued an "Information Paper" on May 12, 20 11 on the car!)'ing of weapons. The paper opens with the classic military "bottom line up
front":
The rules governing how weapons are carried find their origin in the law of wa r, specifi cally the tenet of distinction. The standard for US military members, while in Afghanistan, is to carry their weapons openly. Service members in the CENTCOM Area of
Operations (AOR) must wear thei r weapons openly at all times. Service members may
"ot co"ceal their weapo"s with a perfidious inte"t. 88
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The paper goes on to conclude. "A military member may not conceal his weapon
with an intent to deceive people into believing he does not have a weapon or to
make them believe he is a noncombatant [which the paper calls a "perfidious intent"]."S9 Current State practice. at least by U.S. forces in Afghanistan. reinforces
the existence of the concept of perfidy in non-international armed conflict.

ConciU5ion
A colleague remarked after the Naval War College presentation on perfidy in noninternational armed conflict that he "now understood [my] worldview-you believe that all the rules of international armed conflict should be followed. as a matter of law. in non- international armed conflict." I respectfully disagree with that
conclusion.90 But there is much to be said for an approach that applies general protective principles derived from Additional Protocol II as Bothe. Partsch and Solf
suggest in their comparison of Article Slof AP I and Article 13 of AP II :
Article 13 of Protocol II restates the provisions of the first three paragraphs of Art 51 of
Protocoll. It declares that civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers
arising from military operations.... The Article does not, however, explicitly provide
protection against indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks. nor does it prohibit explicitly the use of civilians to shield military operations. Moreover, it omits any direct
reference to a prohibition against direct attacks or disproportionate collateral damage
with respect to civilian objects... . Some of the specific protection thus omitted may,
however, be inferred from the general protection provided in para.l, but the construction of balanced protection for civilians from the abbreviated Art. 13 places a heavy
burden on the term ~general protection.'>91
They also suggest that the crime of perfidy can be extrapolated from the basic principles recognized in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol I, which provide
protection from harm for those that are hors de combat (fighters who have been
wounded or surrendered on the battlefield). civilians who are not directly participating in hostilities, those who are providing basic humanitarian services on the
battlefield (protected by the red cross. red crescent and red crystal emblems) and
those who have displayed the white flag of surrender.
As evidenced by treatises. the Customary International Humanitarian Law
study, the findings of international tribunals prosecuting war criminals and State
practice. customary international law provides that perfidy is a violation of the
law of war in non-international armed conflict. In her excellent work, War Crimes
in Internal Armed Conflicts, Eve La Haye notes that the amount of State practice and
opinio juris on the protective principle of distinction "fulfils the criteria of an
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extensive and virtually uniform practice, coupled with the belief that this principle is legally obligatory."92 A.P.v. Rogers, in LAw on the Battlefield, concludes that
perfidy consists of conduct that results in killing or wounding an adversary
through "treachery," including "killing by feigning civilian status" or Ilors de combat status, or "improper use of the flag of truce, the red-cross or red-crescent emblems, or the flag or military insignia or uniform of the enemy."93 The ICC
Statute makes "[kJ illing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary" an
"other serious violation [J of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not
of an international character. "'#4 And the jurisprudence, cited above, both domestic and international, supports this view of perfidy as a crime in non-international
armed conflict.9s
Finally, State practice has developed not only to prohibit feigning of civilian status in non-international armed conflict, as evidenced by the Jawad and al-Nashiri
cases, but also to affirmatively prevent violations of this provision by military
forces supporting government efforts in non-international armed conflict.
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